









ambiguous  inclusions:  inside out, outside in30
introduction
Refugee camps are often created and portrayed as places of exclusion where 
“supernumerary” (Bauman 2004), “undesired populations” (Agier 2011) are 
concentrated. And yet, experiences from the Meheba Refugee Settlement show 
that the reality is rather more complex, providing evidence of the ambiguous 
line between inclusion and exclusion involving refugees and the neighbouring 
population.
In order to better “care, cure and control” – in United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (unhcr) terms – internationally displaced 
individuals and communities, the humanitarian aid regime often enacts a set of 
international legal frameworks and provides basic services and infrastructures 
which find their sum in the “refugee camp”. Albeit in different ways and to 
different degrees, humanitarian settings usually provide protection, food 
provisions, access to basic health care and education, economic opportunities as 
well as training programmes. In the context of rural Sub-Saharan Africa, these 
are elements often absent in the refugees’ places of origin but also sometimes 
virtually non-existent among the marginal populations in villages and towns 
near refugee camps. In contrast, once in a refugee camp, displaced individuals 
see the suspension of key fundamental rights such as the right of movement, 
the right of assembly, the right to work, among other limitations, as we shall 
see below. Indeed, refugees do not enjoy the same rights and freedoms – nor 
have the same duties – national citizens, or even regular immigrants, do. But 
to what extent do national states provide their citizens with similar resources 
and entitlements outside a refugee camp?
At the crossroads between humanitarian and state rationales, within the 
“liminality” (Malkki 1995a) embodied by the camp, emerges the paradox 
between the inclusion of the excluded– the refugees who live a “suspended life” 
(Agier 2011) in a sort of “campzenship”1 (Sigona 2015) –, and the exclusion 
of the supposedly included – that is, the citizens belonging to a socially and 
politically defined community and that supposedly fulfil the “national order 
of things” (Malkki 1995b).
1 Campzenship: an attempt “to capture the specific and situated form of membership produced in and 
by the camp, the complex and ambivalent relationship of its inhabitants with the camp and the ways 
the camp shapes the relationship of its inhabitants with the state and their capacity and modes of being 
political (Sigona 2015, 1)”.
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Although sociopolitical divisions and hierarchies among refugees in 
camps – sometimes taking form as dynamics of inclusion and exclusion 
– have been highlighted by different authors in different contexts (Powles 
2000; Veroff 2009; Turner 2010; 2014; Agier 2011). The fact is that similar 
dynamics between refugees and the local population in their relationship 
with the camp has been overlooked (Malkki 1995a; Jansen 2014). In this 
regard, the experiences of refugees and local citizens in the Meheba Refugee 
Settlement is an interesting case study, which brings about insights into the 
ambiguous boundary between inclusion and exclusion among these two 
rather heterogeneous groups. Thus, in order to understand the dialectical 
inclusion/exclusion complementarity the humanitarian logistics entails, and 
before introducing a set of ethnographic accounts from the Meheba Refugee 
Settlement that illustrate the phenomenon, it is necessary to theoretically 
frame the nature of the camp.
Designed by the unhcr alongside (inter)national governments and 
organisations – the “international community” –, refugee camps are 
“extraterritorial spaces” (hors-lieu) by their very nature (Agier 2002; 2011; 
2014; Bauman 2004). Challenging any Euclidian continuity, camps are often 
managed by the unhcr offices in Geneva, in conjunction with the so-called 
implementing partners2 whose headquarters are located, say, in The Hague or 
New York. If, on the one hand, the plight of the camps and their inhabitants 
is usually determined in important decision centres across the world; on the 
other, camps are often set in inhospitable, unpopulated and hard-to-access 
areas, on the periphery of the periphery.
Equally noteworthy is the common absence of their representation in the 
official national cartographies, therefore suggesting the non-existence of refugee 
camps. By taking cartography as ontology, illustrated in a common institutional 
quest for “invisibility” (Harrel-Bond and Voutira 2007), the non-representation 
of camps is a form of denying the existence of such places and their respective 
inhabitants ( Anderson 2006 [1983], 173; Neto 2016). Nevertheless, this does 
not mean that camps do not play a key role at the sociocultural and economic 
level – thereby creating new centres – or that camps cannot be integrated in the 
national cartography at a certain point in time (Agier 2011), closing the circle of 
a protracted state of “liminality” (Malkki 1995a).
2 Implementing partners are the associate governments or non-government agencies that carry out 
institutional arrangements in line with the larger organisation’s goals and objectives.
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In addition, refugee camps are usually enclosed places – fenced, 
geographically and/or socially demarcated –, and therefore physically and 
symbolically separated from the national territory. A clear line between the 
refugee camp and the “outside world” is evident at different levels: a dividing 
line that not only configures a boundary in an anthropological sense: a 
double recognition between refugees and the “others”, or between citizens 
and the “others”. It is a more or less visible physical border – a defined and 
demarcated space –, but also a legal one – knowing how international legal 
frameworks3 and specific local refugee acts rarely coincide with national 
laws applied to citizens. Notwithstanding the existence of specific rights and 
duties in camps, legal measures might be changed, reframed, suspended – or 
simply not enforced (Veroff 2009) – in a more or less arbitrary fashion. In this 
sense, the camp illustrates the physical manifestation of a continuous “state 
of exception” (Agamben 1995; 2005), which alongside its extraterritorial 
character, configures a “space of exception” (Bauman 2004; Agier 2011). At 
the same time, the camp enacts a set of boundaries at the social, economic, 
cultural, political and legal level. These nevertheless configure sites of contact, 
of potentially fruitful conflict, of mediation and interaction between the inside 
and the outside (Barth 1969; Mezzadra and  Neilson 2012). And yet, although 
similar in its operational principles, each refugee camp is one of a kind (see 
the many cases in Agier 2014). In spite of their exceptionality, camps are not 
exclusively composed by ever evolving “walls and fences” but also of flickering 
“doors and windows” (Diken and Laustsen 2005).
In order to examine how different boundaries between inclusion and 
exclusion are continuously – and ambiguously – forged in the Meheba Refugee 
Settlement, I will start by providing a brief background to the camp and outline 
past and present divisions among the refugee community. I will then present a 
set of experiences portraying the struggles and interactions between Zambians 
and refugees, which have the humanitarian infrastructure at their core.
Last but not least, given the size and heterogeneity of Meheba, any effort to 
grasp its complexity as a whole would be easily defeated. Thus, by using the 
term “experiences”, I intend to focus on specific cases and situations I came 
across and that inform of period in which fieldwork was  conducted between 
3 Namely the Refugee International Law, to a large extent based on the 1951 unhcr Geneva Convention 
and the 1967 New York Protocol, among other regional treaties and protocols, and overlapping national 
bills/acts concerning refugees. For the case of Zambia, see the 1970 Refugee Control Act, which was 
repealed and replaced by the Refugees’ Bill in 2017.
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Regional mapFigure 1.1
2012 and 2014. Indeed, as the more recent news, reports and statistics from 
the terrain indicate, the situation in Meheba and in the region has probably 
changed.
meheba refugee camp, a brief context
The Meheba Refugee Camp is an immense agricultural settlement located some 
70 kilometres away from the town of Solwezi, the capital of North-Western 
Province, Zambia (see Figure 1.1). As a result of the growing influx of Angolan 
refugees and increasing insecurity along Zambian eastern borderlands, the 
Government of the Republic of Zambia (grz) passed the Refugee Control 
Act in 1970 (rca 1970), which was at the origin of the creation of Meheba in 
1971. The camp was deployed in an unpopulated area belonging to the Kaonde 
chiefs, which was ceded to the grz, and, in turn, to the unhcr administration.
The escalation of the war in Angola, alongside new and re-emerging conflicts 
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the Democratic Republic of the Congo (drc), Rwanda, Burundi and, more 
recently, Somalia.4 As a consequence, the camp would experience five 
expansions defined in three specific areas: Old Meheba (1971-85), New Meheba 
(1985-1995) and New Extensions (1995-2002) (see Figure 1.2).
The main road of the camp starts from the road connecting Solwezi and 
Mwinilunga. It is in the form of a fishbone and articulates the different blocks. 
The eight blocks or zones of the camp, from A to H, subsequently split into 
perpendicular roads (67 from Block A to E, of roughly 1 km distance from 
each other); and from Rd 68 to 125, Blocks F, G and H, the settlement is 
organised in villages. Meheba does not have a clear demarcated perimeter, 
apart from an entrance gate whose control is erratic. Instead, its limits are 
marked by natural elements – the rivers that flank the eastern and western 
slope of the camp – and by social boundaries – demarcated by the edges of the 
inhabited areas and/or agriculture fields.
The agricultural character5 and continuous flow of refugees largely explain 
the Meheba dimensions, now covering an area of approximately 720 square 
km (roughly 35 km long by 15-25 km wide).
In 2001-2002, the camp registered its population peak of more than 
50,000 refugees – of which 90% were Angolans (wcrwc 2001). Between 
2011 and 2013, the official number was roughly 18,000  refugees (unhcr/
grz 2014), and – though expected to decrease – almost 20,000 as of October 
2017 (unhcr 2017). The end of the conflict in Angola, in 2002, and the 
subsequent repatriation process; the transference of Congolese refugees 
coming from the Northern Province camps (Mwange and Kala) closed in 
2010; as well as the end of refugee status for Angola and Rwanda nationals, 
in 2012, certainly had an impact on Meheba’s demographics. Recent unhcr 
data indicates that Congolese now constitute the most representative group6. 
4 unhcr 2013 census informed about the presence of other less representative nationalities such as the 
Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Sudan and Namibia (unhcr 2013).
5 According to the unhcr, Meheba is not a camp but a settlement. In a settlement, each household 
is allocated a plot of land with the aim of facilitating self-reliance (unhcr 2013). I will refer to Meheba 
either as a camp or settlement in the same way refugees and unchr staff did.
6 As of October 2017, the total number of Congolese refugees stayed at 8,286 (unhcr 2017). The 
displaced Congolese, however, are not a homogeneous community. In spite of sharing the same country 
of origin, Congolese refugees come from different parts of the drc. The oldest Congolese communities 
arrived from the Kasai and Katanga during 1990s, whereas the most recent come mainly from the Kivu, 
Eastern Congo.
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Figure 1.2
Still, access to the number of Zambians living in the camp continues to be 
limited to those officially married to refugees – 196 to be statistically accurate 
(unhcr 2017). Not included in the official figures are those who work for 
the camp’s administration and civil servants (whose offices are located in Rd 
36), the police (whose barracks and offices are located in Rd 6), individuals 
occasionally involved in the unhcr programmes (some living in nearby 
towns and staying occasionally in the unhcr Lodge in Rd 36, others actually 
living in the camp), as well as all those who live in Meheba but are not 
directly linked to the bureaucratic-humanitarian activities. In fact, since the 
early 2000s, that economic opportunities arising from the neighbouring – 
and ever-growing – Lumwana Mine have attracted people, some of whom 
have settled in Meheba.
Meheba refugee settlement map (as of 2015 , adapted from Agier 2011, unhcr 
2017 and Google Maps)
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In 2014, the camp was undergoing profound changes, much as the result of 
a recently approved urban masterplan – promoted by the Lumwana mine – and 
due to refugee resettlement. The new masterplan was devised to host many of 
the Lumwana staff, the required services and facilities, and was planned to take 
over a considerable area from Blocks A, B and C (Neto 2014).7 The on-going 
resettlement programme, essentially involving former Angolan and Rwandan 
refugees who refused repatriation and qualified for local integration, was taking 
place in the more peripheral areas of the camp, in Blocks E, F, G and H, and 
has been conceived to also host some 4,000 Zambian families (unhcr 2017).
Over time, the organisation of the camp would not only reflect the outbursts 
of violence, the presages of peace but also the more recent local integration 
and development processes, which led to the opening, peopling, emptying, 
abandonment or re-organisation of each block.
inclusion and exclusion within the refugee community
While not the main purpose of this paper, it is nevertheless important to 
summarise a set of situations that involve economic, political, social and 
spatial aspects illustrating different dynamics of exclusion and inclusion 
within Meheba’s diverse refugee community.
In 2002, Michel Agier observed how the social stratification within the camp 
was linked to the chronology of the place. The several generations of refugees 
were “sociologically” organised according to the moment of arrival and split 
into settled, recent and new arrivals. The level of autonomy, the housing and 
social hierarchy were intimately linked to the length of stay and location in 
the camp (2011, 121). By then, Agier also perceived a “logic of inclusion in 
domination”, where social relations were almost “normal”. In other words, 
they were unequal but inclusive, as one would find in a village or community, 
where the longstanding inhabitants preserved a set of privileges and status, 
having a protective and dominant role regarding the recent refugees (Agier 
2011, 126-127). Since then, however, the population numbers, characteristics 
and distribution have undergone profound changes, leading to different social 
dynamics and a rather more complex spatial panorama. Even though a “logic 
7 According to recent information from Meheba, the masterplan implementation is currently at a 
standstill.
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of inclusion in domination” was still evident in the period from 2012 to 2014, 
some of the actors had shifted.
First of all, there were striking differences between those who lived in or 
close to the more urbanised areas (near the entrance gate, along the main 
road, in Road 6, Road 18 and Road 36) and those located in the camp’s more 
peripheral, rural areas. Though differences in material conditions – most 
visible at the housing level – were sometimes evident between settled and new 
arrivals, the fact is, given the size of the camp, to live in a more urbanised area 
meant better infrastructures and access to markets, to different agricultural 
produce, to clinics and schools. Some of the populations living in the more 
peripheral pockets, however, actually preferred to stay away from the central 
areas. The voluntary exclusion from the wider social dynamics in the camp 
was deliberate and essentially supported by a set of sociocultural arguments. 
In Block B, G and H, there were groups from Angola who preferred to stay 
apart, these being still visibly traumatised by their experiences of war violence. 
From the contact I had, this was not only a way to keep the cultural system and 
family structure in place but, in their view, was also a self-protection strategy. 
Refugees from Burundi and Rwanda (mainly Hutu) presented another 
noteworthy feature. Living chiefly in Zone G and on the periphery of Zone D, 
these kept contact with the other groups to a minimum – essentially regarding 
trade and the exchange of agricultural surplus (Neto 2016, 99; for possible 
reasons why, see Malkki 1995a).
Ancient tensions between Angolan refugees – supporters or sympathisers 
of mpla or unita8, and whose location in the camp reflected those regional, 
political and sometimes ethnic divisions –, became largely diluted over time 
(Agier 2011, 123; Powles 2000, 15; 2002, 100; Veroff 2009, 62, 64). In reality, 
these no longer involved clear forms of inclusion/exclusion, quite the contrary. 
In 2012, most of the several Angolan refugee communities were united and 
– though unsuccessfully – demanded the right to vote in the then upcoming 
Angolan elections.9
8 mpla (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and unita (National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola) were the main opposing parties during the conflict that ravaged the country. 
The armed conflict between them worsened considerably after independence in 1975, lasting until the 
end of the war in 2002.
9 Although refugees are not entitled to vote in their countries’ national elections nor in those of the 
hosting country, Meheba refugees can elect road and block leaders. Since 2010, after the protests by a 
Congolese group against corruption (see below), those new elections have been suspended.
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If most of the ancient Congolese groups (mainly those coming from the 
Kasai region in the drc) had economic ties with the Angolan communities 
(with most Angolans being involved in farming and the Congolese in trade) 
and inter-marriage was common, the same was not true among the several 
Congolese communities. Indeed, tensions between the drc nationals were 
recurrent, as mutual suspicion and avoidance between groups coming from 
the Kasai, Katanga and Kivu regions was evident, resulting in divisions and 
conflicts along regional and ethnic lines (see note 6).
Moreover, religion was an issue at times. Whereas most of the communities 
in Meheba attended Christian churches (Baptist, Methodist, Adventist, 
Catholic, The Church of the Pastor Brahnam, etc.), Somali refugees professed 
Islam and were therefore looked on with some suspicion. The existence of pig 
farms, namely in Zone H, unwittingly excluded Somalis, who alluded to these 
as “dangerous” areas.
Furthermore, the local integration process, involving former Angolan and 
Rwandan refugees, suggests that these will be set apart from the remaining 
displaced community and probably will not be able to benefit from the same 
humanitarian resources. The inclusive local integration process will therefore 
largely mean a renewed form of exclusion.
These and other aspects were and are at the core of dynamics of (in)voluntary 
inclusion and exclusion among the several refugee groups – aspects reflected 
in, or arising from, socioeconomic, political and cultural expressions, and 
fairly evident in the space. Still, the situation between refugees and Zambians 
and between the camp and the outside is the point that undoubtedly warrants 
more attention.
legal aspects
During my fieldwork, several refugees overtly contested the presence of 
Zambians in the camp. Most complaints were not necessarily directed at 
the bureaucratic-humanitarian staff, but towards those who worked in the 
Lumwana mine and lived in Meheba, and, most of all, towards those who, 
though being Zambians, pretended to be refugees. Some refugees argued that 
there were several “impostors” in Meheba, and that they, the true refugees, were 
the ones really suffering and, therefore, exclusively deserving of humanitarian 
support. The entitlement to the camp – and by extension to humanitarian aid 
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– as a result of a recognised suffering was a strong exclusionary argument in 
relation to non-refugees. According to an elder Angolan refugee, from Block 
B, and whose words could resonate elsewhere: “We suffer and the camp is all 
we have left… and then we see these individuals trying to take advantage and 
seize the few existent opportunities… these are spongers (aproveitadores)… 
Once life was easier here, there was room for all, but lately things have become 
more and more difficult, everything is scarce now.”
Curiously enough, Zambian citizens gave similar accounts about refugees 
who, unwilling to enter a refugee camp – which would confirm them as de 
facto refugees – pretended to be local citizens and sought integration in border 
villages (Hansen 1979a, 1979b; Bakewell 2000, 2007; Silva 2011; Neto 2017a, 
2017b).
It was widely known that there were “illegal refugees” living in the camp.10 
Even if that included the cases of new refugee arrivals who did not go through 
the normal registration procedures – mainly concerning those coming from 
the drc and being de facto refugees nonetheless. There were also cases of 
Zambian nationals who declared themselves refugees and/or had purchased 
refugee id cards. Corruption in the camp was perceived as endemic and a 
group of Congolese refugees who had protested against it – and against the 
living conditions and the absence of some fundamental rights – had faced 
deportation.11 Political  freedoms are dramatically limited within camps and 
refugees are not supposed to meet and discuss, let alone to demonstrate (for 
the laws then applied to refugees in Zambia, see rca 1970).
In early 2010, the camp’s management was handed to the grz, while 
remaining under the supervision of the unhcr. Since then grz members, 
the Refugee Officer (ro) and the Commissioner for Refugees (cor) staff 
have been under investigation. Beyond the selling of gate passes to refugees 
(required to leave the camp for a maximum period of 30 days) and of refugee 
id cards, there was also the suspicion that names had been added for ineligible 
food distribution, and that records that could enhance better resettlement 
opportunities for specific individuals were deliberately changed. Perhaps, 
this was not a recent phenomenon, as official data and statistics seem to have 
10 See, for instance: “Refugees at Meheba occupy unhcr offices to protest corruption”, American 
Embassy in Lusaka (22/02/2010) available at http://wikileaks.wikimee.org/cable/2010 /02/10lusaka110.
html visited on 26th October 2017.
11 Idem.
ambiguous  inclusions:  inside out, outside in40
disappeared and/or been manipulated since the camp’s early days (Hansen 
1990; Bakewell 2012, 12).
According to one Zambian, a member of the grz administration staff and 
who lived and worked in the camp, the major concern was not necessarily 
related to corruption as a whole – even if that was seen as an issue –, but rather 
to specific individuals who, having purchased id cards, had been residing in 
the camp ever since. Such accounts uncovered the existence of individuals 
suspected to be criminals, thieves and rapists – many of them Zambian citizens 
–, who in order to avoid being caught and brought to justice sought refuge in 
the camp. The camp was a hideout and protection came from insertion into a 
different legal framework, which was not actually enforced (Veroff 2009). This 
served both refugees and humanitarian aliens residing in the camp alike, and 
illustrates the materialisation of what Turner (2010) has called the politics of 
innocence. The moment the humanitarian regime constructs the figure of the 
refugee as “bare life” (Agamben 1995), it holds that all refugees are “apolitical”, 
“innocent” and “pure victims”, without “agency”, “roots” and a “past” (Turner 
2010, 160). Arguably, such a framework encompasses virtually all inhabitants 
of camps, whether refugees or not. Although the vast majority of refugees 
had indeed gone through many hardships and either witnessed or had been 
victims of violence in all its forms, it is also true that some refugees were the 
perpetrators themselves. Inasmuch as refugee camps neutralise the lives of 
its inhabitants, former soldiers and guerrilla fighters – who have most likely 
committed crimes and atrocities – live side by side with their victims. For 
better or worse, the exceptional nature of the camp enacts a selective exclusion 
from national jurisdiction(s). Likewise, other non-refugees grabbed this 
opportunity offered by the camp. Indeed, it seems important to acknowledge 
how supposed criminals and troublemakers also bypass the law by seeking 
refuge and settling in humanitarian spaces.
education
During the 1970s and 1980s, Hansen observed how the existent services and 
facilities, as well as the overall material conditions of those living in Meheba, 
were significantly better than those in the surrounding villages or towns 
( Hansen 1990). At that time, international stakeholders provided financial and 
logistical humanitarian support, which kept Meheba running and in shape. 
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However, after the end of the conflict in Angola, in 2002, the humanitarian 
funding and respective activities steadily diminished.12 As a result, most 
of unhcr’s implementing partners gradually left Meheba, meaning that 
infrastructure maintenance and a set of training and food programmes and 
other services almost came to a halt (unhcr 2013), leaving the roads to 
deteriorate, and the schools and clinics in disrepair. Other facilities, like the 
library or the Women’s Centre, were no longer available. Such circumstances 
certainly had an impact on the overall quality of life in the camp. And yet, 
what Hansen had observed a few decades earlier was, to a large extent, still 
true. Meheba still had several schools (from Primary to High School), and the 
continuance of education was probably the most obvious aspect in this regard.
Thus, apart from current and former “refugee children”– mainly Angolans 
who, after being repatriated, returned from time to time to enrol their children 
and/or younger siblings in the Meheba schools –, the presence of Zambian 
youngsters too was hardly surprising. In the same way refugees are attracted 
to better camps and/or try to keep some link with humanitarian settings in the 
hope of further opportunities, the local population were drawn to the camp 
(Horst 2006; Jansen 2014; for Zambia specifically, see Ferguson 1999).
During the camp’s golden period – that is, until the emergency was 
considered over in the early 2000s – Western teachers and skilled volunteers 
were a common presence in Meheba. In 2012-2014, the situation was rather 
different and most of the teachers were Zambians or refugees trained while 
in the camp. In spite of the infrastructural decline and the lack of notebooks 
and schoolbooks, schools had many Zambian students coming from as far as 
Livingstone, Lusaka, Kitwe and Solwezi, whose parents preferred that their 
sons and daughters studied at Meheba. Despite their noticeable presence, 
systematic data with regard to the number and origin of Zambian students at 
Meheba’s different schools was virtually non-existent.
According to the Head of School in Rd 36 (the largest school, and 
which included primary and secondary), to study in Meheba was relatively 
inexpensive, even if that did not mean it was accessible to all.13 Still, for 
12 In 2014, the Norwegian based ngo, Refugee Alliance, was the sole organisation active in Meheba, 
with four volunteers whose role was to carry out school activities and assist at the Block D clinic.
13 According to the Head of School, in 2014, the Basic School (the seven first years) was free; in the 
Secondary School (8th and 9th grades) fees were 65,000 kwacha (roughly 11€) per year; and the High 
School (10th and 12th grades), only in Zone A, had a fee of 85,000 kw (approximately 14€) for each of 
the three terms.
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Zambians, it was not the comparatively low fees that mattered most when 
choosing to enrol their children in Meheba’s schools. As the Head of School 
remarked, children in the camp lived in peace and in harmony with nature14, 
they could play and run freely, and were not separated by sex or nationality. 
There was less danger compared to urban environments, and teaching 
standards were above the national average. The Head of School at the time 
shared the dream of a Rwandese refugee and teacher: that one day Meheba 
could have its own university (from camp to campus?).
As far as the ambiguity between inclusion and exclusion is concerned, 
education was certainly among the most illustrative cases. In spite of being 
located at the “end of the world”, or in the “middle of nowhere” – as some 
Zambians and refugees living outside the camp used to say –, Meheba was, 
in fact, an educational centre providing schooling for refugees and Zambians 
alike. However, the interaction between refugee and non-refugee students was 
not always easy going.
The plight of Cabazo, 15, from Chingola (Copperbelt Province,  Zambia) is 
illustrative of the dynamics between inclusion and exclusion among refugees 
and Zambians. His mother was a nurse in the Block B clinic and Cabazo, after 
attending school, also performed different paid tasks helping other members of 
the Zambian administration. Yet, Cabazo resented his condition in the camp. 
Despite being in Zambia, he “was not from there”. His words were insightful: 
“I don’t know how to play football15, and my schoolmates don’t want me to 
play with them… I don’t speak English well and I am not a good student… 
And they [the refugees] believe I have more things than they do… They don’t 
like me because I’m not a refugee, because I’m not from here, because I don’t 
belong here…”.
The extraterritorial dimension of the camp – which under the aegis of 
the humanitarian government turns the refugee into the autochthonous of 
the enclave – confirms Cabazo as an outsider, a foreigner in what would 
be his national territory in “normal” circumstances. Mirrored dynamics of 
exclusion and inclusion unfold at every opportunity. The local animosity 
14 unhcr has established several rules aimed at protecting the natural environment. Garbage 
collection is mandatory and unhcr authorisation is required to fell trees. However, this does not mean 
that such rules are necessarily followed by refugees or enforced by the authorities.
15 Football constitutes an important event and activity in the camp. Usually during the weekends 
matches take place opposing different communities (e. g. the Angolans vs the Congolese) or multi-
national teams opposing different blocks or roads.
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towards presumed allochthonous, that is, to non-refugee inhabitants, external 
to the humanitarian realm, is fed by the transformation of power structures. 
This is most evident in the access to education, but also to property and jobs 
and which amounts to a set of inclusionary and exclusionary practices and 
behaviour.
socioeconomic aspects
In contrast to Zambian nationals, refugees cannot own property – whether 
the houses or shops they themselves have built or the farming land assigned to 
them, sometimes decades ago. It does not mean, however, that refugees do not 
(il)legally sell “their” houses – this being a common practice upon repatriation. 
In addition, refugees are not officially entitled to work, a legal interdiction 
that, as some refugees pointed out, promoted labour exploitation. For the 
refugees who collaborated in Meheba’s humanitarian activities, conducted 
by a given ngo or the unhcr, the maximum earnings were not more than 
50$us. Instead, Zambians could earn at least four times as much for the same 
task, inevitably causing a profound malaise. Not to mention that there were 
refugees working in the nearby Lumwana mine, while others worked in the 
plots of Zambians – mainly belonging to miners or to those involved in the 
administration staff, who had bought or rented land in Meheba –, and whose 
labour situation was not substantially different.
The impact of changing demographics and new economic dynamics in 
and around Meheba was perceptible. This resulted in real estate speculation, 
increased food prices and directly affected the livelihoods of refugees: 
circumstances that could not but create social unrest.
Furthermore, until 2014, refugees used to sell their harvest surplus in 
order to obtain certain products, but the camp’s overall economy remained 
exchange-based. Likewise, the vulnerables16, who were provided with food 
packs by the humanitarian agencies, also exchanged part of them in order to 
have a more varied diet and/or to obtain other essential products. However, 
16 In humanitarian terms, the vulnerables group consists of single mothers, families with many 
children, orphans, the elderly and/or refugees with some form of handicap. In the case of Meheba, 
they are also those who arrived recently or had not attained self-sufficiency were included. As of 2011, 
unchr data indicated that roughly one third of the camp’s population was still receiving food provisions 
(unhcr 2011).
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not only did repatriation lead to the decline in food production, but the 
 presence of miners contributed to skyrocketing prices. This meant that 
refugees were no longer capable of buying some of the agricultural produce 
that they themselves were growing. Moreover, instead of continuing to 
provide goods and food provisions to the vulnerables, unhcr was planning 
to introduce a cash/voucher system in the settlement, so that targeted 
beneficiaries would be in “the position to purchase food of their own choice” 
(unhcr 2013, 5).
The paradox is nevertheless interesting, as inclusion in the money 
economy, leaving aside an economy predominantly of exchange, of barter-
trade, represented exclusion from the economy in itself (Bauman 2004).
conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have tried to portray a constellation of different 
situations that illustrate the ambiguous boundaries between inclusion and 
exclusion among refugees and the local population in their relation to the 
refugee camp. At their core, one can find sociocultural, economic, legal and 
political aspects enhanced by the extraterritorial nature of the camp.
As a dialectical process, the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion go hand-
in-hand, meaning that – humanitarian or state – subjects are neither fully 
included nor fully excluded. They are never fully insiders nor fully outsiders, 
and continuously oscillate in “zones of indistinction” (Agamben 1995), with 
the camp being emblematic of this.
The paradox between the inclusion of the excluded, and the exclusion of the 
supposed included is an ever evolving process of transformation that cannot 
but bring about change – even if through conflict. By including the excluded 
– in this case, refugees and/or aliens –, humanitarian policies unwittingly 
create new forms of exclusion. Paradoxically then, the excluded are a sort 
of humanitarian aliens. Yet, such circumstances do not go uncontested or 
remain static, as “the outsider is not only the subject to exclusion but also 
becomes a key actor in reshaping, contesting and redefining the border 
of citizenship” (Mezzadra and Neilson 2012, 71) – and/or “campzenship” 
(Sigona 2015). The expected closure of the camp in the foreseeable future 
(unhcr 2017) will mark the moment of its opening, that is, its integration 
in the territorial continuity (Agier 2011; unhcr 2017). To observe and 
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understand how new dynamics between inclusion and exclusion will evolve 
in Meheba, as the local integration process moves forward, will certainly be 
a necessary and significant endeavour.
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